Introduction
It is often argued that the psychological traits characteristic of human communication are uniquely human; and therefore that they emerged in phylogeny only after the split of the hominini clade into the pan and homo lineages (e.g. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ). Consequently, where visually and functionally similar behaviours appear in the homo and other clades-as when, human style, a bonobo beckons another to approach it [7] -the underlying psychological structures are assumed to be fundamentally different.
The assumption is motivated on the grounds that human forms of communication have been thought to require cognitive abilities which apes lack. Nonetheless it is puzzling, because many non-human species engage with us in communicative interaction. For example, great apes in zoos make and respond to simple requests. While they are poor at understanding pointing [8, 9] , they tend to do much better when reared in human environments [10] -suggesting that failure is not due to insurmountable cognitive limitations [11, 12] . Consistent with this, appropriately enculturated apes have developed impressive abilities for understanding human communication. For example, Kanzi, an enculturated bonobo, can understand novel sentences of English at around the level of a child of 2.5 years [13] .
Dogs are also proficient in their understanding of human words and gestures. Not only do they understand pointing [14] , in some cases they comprehend a vocabulary of several hundred words [15] . These successes suggest that animal and human communicative abilities are in at least some respects continuous. Nonetheless, some [1, [4] [5] [6] argue that even in our nearest relatives, the psychological states that support human and animal communication are fundamentally different. While humans are said to be 'Gricean' or 'ostensive-inferential' communicators (terms that will be explained more in due course), this status is denied to non-human animals.
I adopt a very different approach. Building on my previous work [16, 17] and work by others [18] [19] [20] , I argue that with respect to intentional structure, there may be more continuity between humans and animals than others suppose. Two plausible and defensible claims support this view. The first (for which & 2017 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
The Gricean analysis of intentional of communication-named after its author, Paul Grice-is an account of the psychological structures that support human communication. Grice [21] distinguished between 'natural' and 'non-natural' meaning, and took only the latter to be essential for understanding human communication. On his account, non-natural meaning is a property of intentional actions ('utterances') performed by agents acting with communicative intent. In principle, any action performed with these intentions could be communicative. Natural meaning is not a property of intentional action but an entailment relation: if P, then Q. A state of the world (e.g. the presence of dark clouds) is naturally meaningful if its holding can be used to predict the occurrence of another (e.g. rain). Unlike cases of natural meaning, non-naturally meaningful acts are not entailment relations. A speaker's saying and meaning that it will rain does not entail that it will.
Grice argued that what separates communicative (i.e. nonnaturally meaningful) acts from non-communicative acts is their distinctive intentional character. 1 Communicative intentions have a feature not shared by other intentions-namely, their 'overt' or 'ostensive' nature. Although Grice's attempts to capture adequately this feature of communication proved controversial, versions of his account have been widely accepted [1, 4, 17, [22] [23] [24] . The following characterization was first proposed by Neale [24] and captures the features of Gricean communication that have been thought essential: A speaker S non-naturally means something by an utterance x if and only if, for some hearer (or audience) H, S utters x intending:
(1) H to produce a particular response r and (2) H to recognize that S intends (1).
In addition the speaker must also not act with any further intention:
(3) that H should be deceived about intentions (1) and (2) . 2 The first of these clauses states the goal (r) underlying S's production of x-that is, the message that S means to communicate by uttering. Typically, the goal will be either to get H to perform some action, or to produce in him some belief. In conjunction with (3), (2) captures the manner in which communicative acts are overt. It is the addition of these clauses to (1) that turns ordinary intentions into communicative intentions.
An example (taken from [22] ) illustrates the relationship between the clauses. Suppose a restaurant customer wants the waiter to refill her glass. On one way of doing this, she might just leave the glass somewhere he will see it and hope that he refills it. Alternatively, she could go out of her way to bring the glass to the waiter's attention by engaging his eye contact, and then deliberately guiding his attention to it. While in both cases her goal would be to get a refill, on Grice's analysis only in the second is the customer's action overt in the way that communication requires. In the first case, the waiter might have anticipated the woman's needs without realizing her surreptitious goal. However, communication requires that both parties know that they are doing it. The second and third clauses of the analysis above capture this overtness, by ensuring that communicative acts are public, and thereby making the speaker's act common knowledge between interlocutors [25, 26] .
The appeal to publicity in philosophy can be controversial, because on classical analyses common knowledge is cognitively demanding. For example, according to Lewis [25] , for S and H to have common knowledge that S uttered x, H would need know that S knew that H knew that S uttered x, and S would need to know that H knew this, and so on. Recent work has shown, however, that cognitively undemanding explications of publicity can be given [17, 27] . On these views, S and H need only stand in such a relationship (e.g. the right sort of visuospatial relationship) that they, or an appropriately enabled individual, could make the relevant inferences. They need not be able to make the inferences themselves.
Gricean communication and human uniqueness
Authors in the discontinuity tradition of language evolution research [1, [4] [5] [6] 22] argue that while human communication is both ostensive and intentional, animal communication is merely intentional. They deny that animals are capable of Gricean communication, because on traditional readings, Gricean communication requires socio-cognitive abilities that animals are thought to lack-in particular, (i) possession of a concept of belief, (ii) the ability to make complex inferences about others' goal-directed behaviour, and (iii) the ability to entertain fourth-order metarepresentations (for discussion see [17] and the work of others [16] [17] [18] [19] , I argue that the cognitive abilities required for Gricean communication have been overstated. Because Gricean communication is easier than others have thought, in many cases the difficulty lies not in attributing communicative intentions per se, but in attributing particular types of communicative intentions that are pragmatically difficult. Consequently, some animal species may be able to act with and attribute at least some simple communicative intentions [12, 16, 17] . This would make them 'minimally Gricean' communicators. Here, the word 'minimal' denotes not that these animals are Gricean communicators in a partial or somehow derivative sense, but just indicates that the repertoire of Gricean acts that they can produce and understand may be much smaller and simpler than ours. For example, it is uncontroversial that animals cannot talk about mental states or use and understand irony; but these are not necessary for Gricean communication.
Minimally Gricean communication
On the view that I have defended, it is sufficient for acting with Gricean intent that a speaker S produces, in conjunction, (i) a sign (or series of signs, like combinations of words and gestures) x, in order to elicit some behavioural response or action r from her interlocutor H, and (ii) an act of address, with which she solicits the attention of her intended interlocutor, and directs her performance of it to him [16, 17] . Acts of address are normally marked by the performance of one or more type of ostensive cue-such as eye contact, or directed vocalizations; behaviours that are found in both humans and animals [16] [17] [18] . On the minimally Gricean account, the signs that S produces will satisfy the first clause of the Gricean analysis, by giving expression to S's communicative goal. If she intentionally uses ostensive cues to address these signs to her interlocutor, and so long as she does not act with any further deceptive intentions (3), S will satisfy Grice's second clause-and her utterance will be ostensive in the sense that Grice sought to characterize. This is because when S addresses her utterance to H's attention, she will make its performance public between them. By definition, a speaker who addresses her utterances in this way will be a Gricean communicator.
The claim that acting with Gricean intent requires only that speakers know how to address their utterances to others is supported by a series of arguments showing that Gricean communication can be cognitively undemanding [17] . While traditional views hold that Gricean communication requires (i) a concept of belief, (ii) the ability to make difficult inferences about others' goals, and (iii) fourthorder metarepresentational abilities, these readings intellectualize the communicative phenomena that Grice sought to describe. To be a minimally Gricean communicator, one needs only to act with and attribute very simple communicative intentions. This requires only knowing how to address utterances, and to make simple inferences about the goals underlying others' intentional communicative behaviour. As these abilities lie within the repertoire of some nonhuman species, they may be Gricean communicators. This could be true even if the repertoire of utterances that they can produce and understand is small, and consists only of utterance types that are simple and easily interpreted. For example, wild chimpanzees seem capable of producing and understanding a lexicon of around 65 gestures [29] and perhaps half a dozen vocal calls [30] [31] [32] [33] . These are used to communicate only around 30 or so very simple messages; and many gestures consist of the presentation of naturally meaningful states of the body. Nonetheless, if apes produce these utterances with intentions like those described above, they would be Gricean communicators [16, 17] . While chimpanzees are comparatively poor at understanding pointing, against some views [28] this does not entail that they cannot attribute communicative intentions in general. More likely, they are simply poor at making the pragmatic inferences that pointing requires [12] .
Roving coral grouper fish (Plectropomus pessuliferus marisrubri) have also been argued to gesture referentially by performing 'headstands' for their hunting partners, usually giant moray eels (Gymnothorax javanicus), to show them the location of hidden prey [34] . So long as these acts are produced intentionally in pursuit of particular communicative goals, and appropriately addressed to their intended audience, then fish would also be Gricean communicators-even if their repertoire consists of this gesture alone.
Having previously argued that there are no strong grounds to deny that chimpanzees could be Gricean communicators [16, 17] , here I develop my earlier argument to claim that ostensive forms of communication likely appear in non-primate clades. Ostension is functionally important to many forms of intentional communication, because intentional communication is ordinarily causally inefficacious. That is, it works only because hearers respond to communicative acts appropriately; and because elements of this response are under hearers' intentional control. As appropriate responses are in no way ensured by non-ostensive performances, and because ostensive behaviours serve to increase the likelihood that hearers respond appropriately to communicative acts, selection processes for ostension are likely to have operated across non-human clades.
Before turning to the role of ostension in communicative behaviour, I elaborate the claim that communicative acts are causally inefficacious by revisiting a historical debate in the literature on Gricean communication.
Grice's third clause
In its earliest expression, Grice's analysis of non-natural meaning contained a different third clause from the one adopted above. As in other post-and neo-Gricean formulations (e.g. [22, 24] ), the account here retains the first two clauses of Grice's original analysis, but replaces Grice's original third clause. (The new (3) was added to insulate the analysis against arguments from Strawson [35] and Schiffer [26] , which showed that Grice's original formulation had failed to provide sufficient conditions for intentional communication.) Following neo-Gricean reformulations of Grice's account [22, 24] , the account developed here rejects Grice's original third clause (hereafter (3 rej )).
In Grice's original analysis, a speaker S was said to nonnaturally mean something by an utterance x if and only if, for some hearer (or audience) H, S utters x intending:
(1) H to produce a particular response r, (2) H to recognize that S intends (1), and that (3 rej ) H should fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfilling (2)-i.e.
on the basis of his recognizing S's intention that he should r.
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Grice explained the introduction of (3 rej ) as follows: will always underdetermine the content of her message (related to r), reason and inference will be needed to figure out the particular goal with which a speaker utters on a given occasion. The processes by which the speaker's intention is inferred can be sub-personal, and so need not take the form of conscious reasoning. Nonetheless, the nature of hearers' responses to speakers' utterances differentiates them from paradigmatic cases of non-communicative causal processes. For example, if I tickle you with the intention of making you laugh, my tickling causes your laughter without being mediated by any inference about what I am trying to achieve; and I achieve my goal whether or not you attribute it to me. By contrast, suppose that you ask me if I would like more coffee, and I reply 'It's late'. Because my telling you that it is late will not directly answer your question, you will need to infer that I am declining your offer. This inference requires that, in at least some sense, I reason about why you spoke as you did and attribute to you a communicative goal related to your refusal. Communicative interactions like this one are pervasive. On Sperber & Wilson's view, it is because hearers must infer speakers' communicative goals that speakers must produce their utterances ostensively: the ostensive performance alerts H to the need to infer S's communicative intention. Ostension is thus the solution to the causal inefficacy of communication.
On Sperber & Wilson's interpretation of Grice, it is because human communication proceeds via reason and inference that Grice introduced (3 rej ). Grice further justified this introduction on the grounds that it precluded from being counted as communicative certain cases that he thought problematic. One such case was the now notorious example of Herod's presenting Salomé with the head of John the Baptist. In Grice's example, Herod presents Salomé with the head of John the Baptist to inform her that he is dead. Herod does this intending both (1) to produce in Salomé a belief that John the Baptist is dead and (2) that Salomé recognize that he intends this.
If these intentions are together sufficient for communication (and assuming they are produced non-deceptively) then, by definition, Herod acts with communicative intent. However, Grice argues that this cannot be right. Communication is, on Grice's account, a process in which speakers act with and hearers attribute communicative intentions. As the A standard interpretation of (3 rej ) is that naturally meaningful states cannot be vehicles for the expression of communicative intent. Because the head of John the Baptist is naturally meaningful, Herod cannot present it to Salomé with communicative intent. Nonetheless, while there is something right about the requirement that communication is a rational and not a causal process, the requirement that naturally meaningful states cannot be used communicatively has unappealing consequences.
Problems with (3 rej )
According to Grice's analysis of meaning, it is the distinctive ostensive structure of communicative acts-i.e. their intentional form-that makes them communicative. However, (3 rej ) is inconsistent with this conclusion-because in at least some cases it makes whether or not an act was communicative a matter of the content of an act, not the form.
According to Grice's own argument, Herod shows Salomé the head of St John the Baptist as a way of producing in her the belief that (i) St John the Baptist is dead.
Grice argues that this act cannot be used to communicate this message, because the severed head alone would suffice to lead Salomé to form the relevant belief irrespective of her attributing to Herod any communicative intent. Yet a speaker could sometimes perform the same act of presenting St John's head communicatively, even by Grice's lights; and these cases are only minimally different from the ones ruled out by (3 rej ). These cases are legitimate because the speaker's communicative goal is less closely tied to the presentation of the head. For example, Herod could present St John's head as a way of stating:
(ii) I have killed St John the Baptist, (iii) My word is my bond, or (iv) This is how a good king rules.
For each of these utterances, the presence of the head alone underdetermines the content of Herod's message. For instance, in (ii) the presentation of the head is consistent with St John's having been killed by someone else; and St John's severed head alone would be insufficient for H to infer S's messages in (iii) and (iv). Consequently, Salomé would need to engage in some reasoning to make sense of Herod's communicative goals. The presentation of naturally meaningful states is, then, consistent with a system of communication in which hearers must attribute communicative intentions.
These cases also show why (3 rej ) is problematic. Its inclusion entails that a speaker can act with communicative intent if she presents St John's head intending to communicate that I have killed St John the Baptist; but the very same act is ruled uncommunicative if she thereby intends to communicate that St John the Baptist is dead. (See [38] for similar cases.) With respect to the question of whether or not these rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org Interface Focus 7: 20160107 utterances are meaningful, though, they are evidently on a par. If each of (ii) -(iv) counts as a communicative act, then so should (i). As (3 rej ) precludes this, it should be rejected.
In addition to its being consistent with intentional communication, in many cases, the presence of natural meaning can help a hearer to attribute communicative intentions. For example, in the above case Salomé might grasp that because John the Baptist is dead, and because Herod was presenting her with his head, his communicative goal must be to inform her that John the Baptist is dead. Cases of showing-in which speakers inform their interlocutors about the world by deliberately drawing their attention to naturally meaningful states of it [39] -are an important part of both human and non-human communication. They also make for acts of communication that are easy to interpret, because the inferences that H must make to recover S's goal are particularly salient [12] . There are many cases of showing in the animal kingdom. For example, when bonobos want to mate, they intentionally present their intended partners with their genitals [40] . As sex solicitation is not the only reason why one might do this, such acts may require that their audience attribute a communicative goal to the speaker-but these goals will be very easy to identify on the basis of the display behaviour.
The recognition of showing as a species of intentional communication is made possible only by excluding (3 rej ), this constitutes a further reason for its rejection. This case also demonstrates that there can be Gricean communication in which the reasoning required for attributing communicative intentions can be minimal or even absent. Such cases are also common in human communication. For example, comprehension of many uses of literal speech requires little in the way of pragmatic reasoning.
An unavoidable asymmetry
The denial of (3 rej ) generates cases of speaker -hearer asymmetry. S can express a communicative intention by showing a naturally meaningful behaviour to H, and H responds in the manner intended by S, but without attributing to her a communicative goal (or vice versa). 3 Consistent with Grice's original anxiety, the sight of St John's head might cause Salomé to believe that he was dead without her attributing to Herod any communicative goal. Cases like this are real, and may occur in both human and animal interactions. They show that Gricean intentions need not always be met with Gricean responses, and when looking for Gricean communication in the animal kingdom, we should be sensitive to this possibility. Just as we ought not to assume that speakers are acting with communicative intent on the basis of behaviour alone, we ought not to assume that hearers attribute communicative intentions to speakers based only their responses. (This holds for animals' responses to human communication too.) At the same time, the lack of an appropriate response on the hearer's part is not an adequate ground for denying that a speaker acted with communicative intent. This is determined solely by the speaker's intentions. This asymmetry means that empirically determining when hearers are attributing communicative intentions may be difficult. Further complicating matters, there could in principle be individuals and even species who can act with but not attribute communicative intentions. Nonetheless, the ability to act with communicative intentions should be a predictor of the ability to attribute them-because the abilities required for acting with and attributing communicative intentions are overlapping. Animals who are hearers on one occasion will be speakers on another; and the psychological capacities they possess in one role will be present in the other [41] . To be confident that animals are attributing communicative intentions, we should look for cases in which H's responding to S appropriately would require her to make some pragmatic inference about S's communicative intention. 4 To shed light on whether or not animals act with Gricean intentions, we can use the diagnostic test that I outline at the end of this paper.
The functional role of ostension in intentional communication
While (3 rej ) is not a proper part of the characterization of the intentions needed for communication, the insight that intentional communication is causally inefficacious is important. It also provides an argument for the conclusion that ostension is likely to be a common feature of communication in many non-human species. Success in some social interactions depends only on one of those present. For example, if I creep up behind you and tickle you, then the success of my actions will be independent of any intentional response on your part. You need not be aware of my behaviour for it to succeed. In important respects, communication is not like this. For example, if I gesture to request that you refill my glass, then the success of my communicative act will depend on a number of things-including your seeing my gesture, appreciating that it was intended for you, and that it was produced with the intention that you respond to it. Accordingly, there are many ways in which communicative acts might fail. I might speak too quickly or too quietly, or produce my gestures where you could not see them; or fail to make it clear that my gestures were being produced in order to solicit a response from you, and not someone else [17] . In all of these respects, my chances of communicating successfully would improve if I knew how to address my utterances to you, to increase your chances of responding appropriately. To the extent that I was unable to do this, my ability to communicate would suffer. This requirement is not unique to humans. The need to address gestures to their intended audience is just the same whether one is a human asking a waiter to refill one's glass, a bonobo trying to solicit sex from a peer, or a fish gesturing for its hunting partner.
Ostension and inference
As ostensive cues can motivate hearers to make communicative inferences, there is a close relationship between ostension and inference in communication. Csibra & Gergely [43, 44] have argued that humans are hard-wired to recognize ostensive cues like direct gaze as indicating that a speaker is acting with a communicative intention of which they are the intended recipient. This is thought to be part of an adaptation to help children learn from communication. On the basis of a speaker's ostensive signals, her audience can grasp that she has a communicative intention, and engage their inferential abilities to figure out its intended content.
Against Csibra & Gergely, the function of ostensive cues need not be limited to human interactions. Moreover, we
speech, the inferences that a hearer makes about a speaker's communicative goal may sometimes be very simple. However, the speaker's address will still be functionally important, because it will identify the hearer as the intended addressee of the utterance. This will hold equally for many non-human species. Many communicative acts-for example threat displays and sex solicitations-are addressed to very particular audiences; and their significance to onlookers will depend on who is taken to be the intended addressee. So even where the role of inference in communication is minimal, ostension remains important. While ostension and inference are invariably presented as a package deal, in theory and practice they come apart.
In conditions where speakers' utterances must be addressed to specific audiences, and where successful communication would benefit both speaker and hearer, selection pressure would likely have arisen for ostensive performance. This may be especially true where speakers must monitor their interlocutor's response. Even across clades, the same sorts of behaviours would likely function as ostensive signals. Direct gaze is an effective form of address because it enables a communicator to both specify the intended recipient of her utterance and monitor their responses. In human communication, attention to the face and eyes allows us to check for indicators of confusion or understanding; and allows us to hold our interlocutors accountable if they fail to respond to what we have said. While in some great ape species direct gaze is related to threat displays, it is still used (fleetingly) in communicative interaction [19] . Thus, the use of eye contact for addressing communicative acts may well have evolved in parallel across even distantly related clades.
Returning to (3 rej )
The above suggests that ostensive behaviour is just a means for S to address her causally inefficacious utterance x to H, in order to improve her chances of fulfilling her communicative goal. If right, this provides a new way to think about (3 rej ). Perhaps what Grice was trying to articulate was the idea that communicative acts work not because they exploit causal properties of the world, but because they exploit the rational tendencies of intentional agents. However, precisely because the actions performed by communicating agents tend to be causally inefficacious, they do not work unless appropriately addressed. To suppose that 'H should fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfilling (2)' is therefore to suppose that H responds to S's utterance because he recognizes himself as its intended addressee.
This interpretation of (3 rej ) does not require restoring its role in Grice's analysis of meaning-but it suggests that Grice's original formulation pointed to an important feature of communication, even if Grice articulated it unsatisfactorily. Moveover, thinking about communication in this way does not intellectualize the rational tendencies of non-human animals. The relevant sense of 'rational tendencies' here can incorporate the idea of goal attribution: intentional communication succeeds not through the sorts of causal processes involved in tickling, but because hearers attribute communicative goals to one another. Even if animals do not contemplate the reasons for which others act [45] , they do predict and respond to the goals of con-and heterospecifics (e.g. [46] ) and it is this goal attribution that is central to the interpretation of communicative acts. Contrary to some neoGricean views [47] , this characterization does not require that communicators grasp that communication works via reason and inference. However, understanding how communication works is not a pre-requisite for engaging in it.
11. An alternative explanation of the data There are good reasons to think that non-human great apes gesture with Gricean intentions. All ape species make eye contact before gesturing, as is characteristic of ostensive performance in humans [19] . Moreover, they go out of their way to gesture within the attentional frame of their interlocutors [16] . Fish also direct their mechanically ineffective gestures towards their intended interlocutors [34] . However, whether there are non-human Gricean communicators is an empirical claim, and so could be refuted by evidence of the intentions with which communicators act.
Whether animals communicate ostensively or merely pseudo-ostensively could be tested empirically [16] . The appropriate test evaluates whether speakers are able to respond differentially to different sorts of breakdown in their communicative interactions. In the Gricean characterization of meaning something by an utterance, the first clause specifies what response a communicator seeks to solicit from her interlocutor, while the second characterizes the way in which a speaker addresses herself to her audience. If communicators have some grasp of this distinction, then they should behave differently in response to communication breakdowns when utterances are not understood, and when they have not been appropriately addressed to their audience. If a subject has misaddressed her utterance, she ought to solicit her interlocutor's attention before reproducing the same gesture. By contrast, if an utterance has not been understood, a speaker ought to try to rephrase her utterances-for example, by producing a related but different utterance. Here, communicators need not solicit attention again before producing reformulated utterances.
Such tests have not yet been conducted on apes, or (to my knowledge) on any other species. However, even grouper fish might qualify as Gricean communicators on this basis. In their descriptions of grouper fish pointing, Vail and co-workers write:
In 9 out of 11 . . . hunts where the moray did not inspect the headstand-indicated crevice, the grouper swam to within 20 cm of the moray (in three cases after a wrasse investigated the indicated crevice and then departed), performed the horizontal shimmy signal used for partner recruitment, and then immediately swam back towards the previously indicated crevice. [34, p. 5] This behaviour is suggestive of an ostensive signal being re-used to re-solicit attention after a previous headstand gesture failed to produce the desired response. (Of course, for Gricean explanations of this behaviour to be fully supported, associative, non-Gricean explanations would have to be ruled out. ) Fischer & Price [48] (and, in unpublished papers, Ron Planer and Till Vierkant) have argued that the assumption that apes produce their gestures ostensively is not the only way to explain their communicative behaviour. They claim that eye contact in apes may simply be a background condition on the circumstances in which apes communicate:
[A] simpler explanation might be that the signalling behaviour of these animals is goal-oriented, and that the animals have learned that they need to establish eye contact before gesturing, otherwise they would not be able to achieve their goals. [48, p. 19] Although debates about what constitutes a simple explanation may be intractable [49] , Fischer & Price are right that the data could be explained in this way. The presence of eye contact alone is insufficient for communication to be genuinely ostensive: it needs to be the expression of the second clause of Grice's analysis. As Fischer & Price make clear, this may not be the case. Their objection can be met in two ways.
First, in many cases [1, [4] [5] [6] , the argument for the claim that animal communication is not ostensive is motivated by an intellectualization of what is required for ostensive communication. Indeed, the standard view of the cognitive pre-requisites of ostension is so cognitively demanding that it throws into question the possibility that children under 10 could be Gricean communicators [17, 50] . The minimally Gricean view of communication rejects this intellectualization. Acting ostensively requires only that one intends to address one's utterances to one's intended audience. This may be a basic part of the behavioural repertoire of many species [16] . Consequently, while animal communication may not be ostensive, the reasons for assuming that it is not may be weak.
Only the collection of empirical data will settle this matter conclusively. It would likely confirm that some species are not Gricean communicators after all. For example, it may be that apes but not monkeys are Gricean communicators; or that primates are but fish are not. For the time being, though, the insistence that animal communication is not ostensive seems to be a consequence of attachment to two contentious claims: first, that Gricean communication is cognitively difficult; and second, that in evaluating animal cognition, assumptions of discontinuity should be our default null hypothesis [51, 52] .
Second, as Sterelny [20] has pointed out, the causal-precondition account lends itself to a plausible story about the development of ostensive behaviour. If creatures start off with a learned expectation that their gestures only work when others are attending to them, then in time they may go out of their way to solicit others' attention before gesturing. This would constitute a smooth transition from the Fischer & Price story to the development of ostensive communicative abilities, and is consistent with the test of ostensive behaviours suggested above. If it turned out that subjects started to repair communication differently only after an extended period of learning, this would not show that they were not (at least at the end of the study) communicating ostensively. Rather, it would demonstrate only that the difference between ostensive and non-ostensive performance is smaller than has been assumed. The transition from non-ostensive to ostensive communication may itself be a point of continuity within and between species. For example, around the end of their first year children get better at combining their gestures with directed gaze [53] -suggesting a possible transition of the kind just mentioned.
Minimally ostensive behaviour
While many species of communicator would benefit from producing their gestures ostensively, even within species there may also be variation in the behavioural expressions of ostension. For example, in cases of great urgency, or where we might be ignored, humans address their utterances more insistently. In other cases, behavioural expressions of ostension may be minimal. In much human communication, behavioural expressions of Grice's second clause intention may consist of little more than sporadic checks on an interlocutor's attention. In looking for evidence of ostensive behaviours in non-human animals, we should be sensitive to the possibility that contextual features of their interactions would modulate the ostensiveness of their behaviour, just as they do ours.
Additionally, ostensive behaviours (like eye contact) may be far more important in some modalities of communication than others. For example, in vocal alarm calls, a caller's intended audience may be indiscriminately large, out of sight. In such cases, a speaker might express her intention (2) only by calling loudly and where it was likely to be heard by others. Consequently, the behavioural expression of ostension should be conceived as matters of degree. Just as the attribution of communicative goals may require little in the way of inference, so addressing utterances may sometimes involve relatively non-ostensive behaviours.
Why is this 'Gricean'?
These arguments suggest that Gricean communication is not limited to humans. On the contrary, it may be the right framework for thinking about the communicative interactions of non-human species from apes, to dogs, and even fish. Given that Grice himself worried that the intentions he characterized were 'plainly too sophisticated a state to be found in a language-destitute creature' [54, p. 85] , some may find this unpalatable. If minimally Gricean communication is cognitively much less demanding than was envisaged by Grice, perhaps it ought not to carry his name at all?
There are good reasons to reject this move. The 'minimally Gricean' communication described here differs from the interactions first described by Grice in only two key respects-the absence of (3 rej ), and the complexity of the cognition that it requires. However, the following features remain from Grice's original analysis:
(1) Communicative acts are a species of goal-directed behaviour, whose communicative nature is defined by their intentional character. (2) The content of communicative acts can be specified by reference to the response r that S intends to elicit in her interlocutor H, as in Grice's first clause intention. All of these points correspond to features of Grice's original analysis [21] . By continuing to use his name to describe the 'minimally Gricean' acts described here, we can hold onto these key ideas, while extending the value of his insights. Rather than thinking of Gricean intentions as a source of discontinuity in the animal kingdom, we can recognize them as a potential source of unappreciated continuity.
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